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Abstract
In order to be simultaneously effective and liberal, governments must normally be able to count on 
voluntary compliance – which, in turn, depends on the support of socially shared legitimacy beliefs. 
In Western constitutional democracies, such beliefs are derived from the distinct but coexistent tra-
ditions of “republican” and “liberal” political philosophy. When judged by these criteria, the Euro-
pean Union – if considered by itself – appears as a thoroughly liberal polity which, however, lacks 
all republican credentials. But this view (which seems to structure the debates about the “European 
democratic deficit”) ignores the multilevel nature of the European polity, where the compliance of 
citizens is requested, and needs to be legitimated by member states – whereas the Union appears 
as a “government of governments” which is entirely dependent on the voluntary compliance of its 
member states. What matters primarily, therefore, is the compliance-legitimacy relationship bet-
ween the Union and its member states – which, however, is normatively constrained by the basic 
compliance-legitimacy relationship between member governments and their constituents. Given the 
high consensus requirements of European legislation, member governments could and should be 
able to assume political responsibility for European policies in which they had a voice, and to justify 
them in “communicative discourses” in the national public space. This is not necessarily true of 
“non-political” policy choices imposed by the European Court of Justice. By enforcing its “liberal” 
program of liberalization and deregulation, the ECJ may presently be undermining the “republican” 
bases of member-state legitimacy. Where this is the case, open non-compliance is a present danger, 
and political controls of judicial legislation may be called for.
Zusammenfasssung
Um gleichzeitig effektiv und liberal sein zu können, ist staatliche Herrschaft auf freiwillige Folgebe-
reitschaft angewiesen – die ihrerseits der Unterstützung durch sozial geteilte Legitimitätsüberzeu-
gungen bedarf. In den demokratischen Verfassungsstaaten des Westens werden solche Überzeugun-
gen aus den unterschiedlichen, aber komplementär zusammenwirkenden Traditionen der „repub-
likanischen“ und der „liberalen“ politischen Philosophie hergeleitet. An diesen Kriterien gemessen 
erscheint die Europäische Union – wenn man sie für sich betrachtet – als eine „liberale“ politische 
Ordnung, der jedoch alle „republikanischen“ Legitimitätsmerkmale fehlen. Aber eine solche Sicht-
weise, die auch die derzeitige Diskussion über ein „europäisches Demokratiedefizit“ bestimmt, ver-
kennt den Mehrebenencharakter des europäischen Gemeinwesens. In ihm sind es die Mitgliedstaaten, 
die Entscheidungen der Union gegenüber den eigenen Bürgern durchsetzen und auch legitimieren 
müssen, während es für die Union ihrerseits auf die freiwillige Folgebereitschaft ihrer Mitgliedstaa-
ten ankommt. Dabei werden diese jedoch durch die normativen Grundlagen ihrer eigenen Legiti-
mität begrenzt. Politische Entscheidungen auf europäischer Ebene setzen breiten Konsens voraus, 
und die Regierungen sollten sie deshalb auch gegenüber den eigenen Bürgern in „kommunikativen 
Diskursen“ vertreten und dafür die politische Verantwortung übernehmen können. Dies gilt jedoch 
nicht notwendigerweise auch für Entscheidungen der europäischen Politik, die im nichtpolitischen 
Modus ohne Beteiligung des Rates und des Parlaments vom Europäischen Gerichtshof bestimmt 
werden. Mit der gegenwärtigen Radikalisierung seines „liberalen“ Programms der Liberalisierung 
und Deregulierung des nationalen Rechts könnte der Gerichtshof in der Tat die „republikanischen“ 
Grundlagen der mitgliedstaatlichen Legitimität unterminieren. In diesem Falle könnte die Union 
sich nicht länger auf die Folgebereitschaft ihrer Mitgliedstaaten verlassen. Um diese Gefahr für die 
europäische Integration zu vermeiden, sollte eine stärkere politische Kontrolle der richterlichen 
Rechtsetzung erwogen werden. 
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1 Legitimacy
In my understanding, any discussion of legitimacy in the multilevel European polity 
needs to start from a functional perspective: Socially shared legitimacy beliefs serve 
to create a sense of normative obligation that helps ensure voluntary compliance with 
undesired rules or decisions of governing authority (Scharpf 1999, 2007; Höffe 2002: 
40). By providing justification and social support for the “losers’ consent” (Anderson et 
al. 2005), such beliefs will reduce the need for (and the cost of) controls and sanctions 
that would otherwise be needed to enforce compliance.1 They should be seen, therefore, 
as the functional prerequisite for governments which aim to be simultaneously effective 
and liberal. 
From this functional starting point, further exploration could either take an empirical 
turn, focusing on citizens’ compliance behavior and justifying beliefs, or a normative 
turn, focusing on good reasons for such beliefs. Here, I will focus on the normative 
discussion. 
Republican and liberal legitimating discourses 
Contemporary normative discourses in Western constitutional democracies are shaped 
by two distinct traditions of political philosophy, which may be conventionally labelled 
“republican” and “liberal” (Bellamy 2006). Even though individual authors may have 
contributed to both of these traditions, their origins, premises, generative logics and 
conclusions are clearly distinguishable. 
The republican tradition can be traced back to Aristotle. To him, the polity is prior to 
the individual and essential for the development of human capabilities.2 What matters 
is that the powers of government must be employed for the common good – and the 
problem, under any form of government, is the uncertain “virtuousness” of governors 
who might pursue their own self-interests instead. The concern for the common good of 
the polity, and its institutional preconditions, had also shaped the political philosophy 
of republican Rome (Cicero 1995) which was resurrected in the Florentine Renaissance 
(Machiavelli 1966). From there, one branch of the republican tradition leads through 
This paper has benefited greatly from discussions at EUI, Florence, and BIGSSS, Bremen, and from 
the personal comments of Martin Höpner at MPIfG, Cologne. As was true of all my recent work, Ines 
Klughardt’s research assistance has again been invaluable. 
1 The need for, or functional importance of, legitimacy is a variable, rather than a constant. It 
rises with the severity and normative salience of the sacrifices requested, and it falls if opt-outs 
are allowed – e.g., if the waiting lists in a national health system can be avoided through access 
to foreign providers (Martinsen 2009). 
2 Aristoteles 1989, Erstes Buch, 1253a.
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the “neo-Roman” theorists of the short-lived English Revolution to the political ide-
als of the American Revolution (Pocock 1975; Skinner 1998; Dahl 1989: ch. 2) and to 
contemporary concepts of “communitarian” democracy (Pitkin 1981; MacIntyre 1984; 
1988; Pateman 1985; Michelman 1989; Taylor 1992; cf. Habermas 1992: 324–348). The 
other branch leads to the radical egalitarianism of Rousseau’s Contrat Social, which 
shaped the political thought of the French Revolution and continues to have a power-
ful influence on Continental theories of democratic self-government. With the classical 
heritage Rousseau shares the primacy of the polity and the emphasis on the common 
good, to which he adds the postulate of equal participation in collective choices.3 
But then for him as for Aristotle, the “virtuousness” of the collective governors becomes 
a critical problem – requiring the transformation of a self-interested volonté de tous into 
a common-interest oriented volonté générale. This theoretical difficulty was pragmati-
cally resolved by the invention of represent ative democracy, coupling the medieval rep-
resentation of estates with the aspirations of democratic self-government (Dahl 1989: 
28–30). Here, the orientation of representatives to the common good is to be ensured by 
the twin mechanisms of public deliberation (Habermas 1962; Elster 1998) and electoral 
accountability, while the egalitarianism of democratic republicanism is reflected in the 
fundamental commitment to universal and equal suffrage. 
Compared to republicanism, the “liberal” tradition is younger, going back to the early 
modern period and Thomas Hobbes (1986) rather than to Greek and Roman antiquity. 
Here, priority is assigned to the individual rather than to the polity; the state is justified 
by the need to protect individual interests; and individual self-determination replaces 
the value of collective self-determination. What matters, once the state has established 
basic security, are strict limitations on its governing powers in order to protect the fun-
damental value of “negative liberty,” which – in the tradition of John Locke and Adam 
Smith – should be understood as the “freedom of pursuing our own good in our own 
way” (Berlin 1958: 11). 
Where the need for governing powers cannot be denied, individual liberty is best pre-
served by a rule of unanimous decisions (Buchanan/Tullock 1962) or, in any case, by 
the checks and balances of multiple-veto constitutions and pluralist patterns of interest 
intermediation (Dahl 1967). If at all possible, decisions ought to be based on the con-
sensus of the interests affected rather than on majority votes. 
In the Continental branch of enlightenment philosophy, by contrast, Immanuel Kant 
grounded the individualist position not in self-interest, but in the moral autonomy and 
rationality of the individual. Being at the same time free and morally obliged to follow 
their own reason, individuals will see that their liberty is constrained by the equal free-
dom of all others – which means that their choices must be governed by the “categorical 
imperative” (Kant 1961). But given the “crooked timber” of human nature, the moral 
3 Rousseau 1762/1959,1. Buch: 6. Kapitel; 2. Buch: 1., 4. Kapitel. 
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imperative alone does not suffice in practice to ensure the mutual compatibility of in-
dividual liberties. There is a need, therefore, for general laws that are effectively sanc-
tioned by state authority. Such laws will approximate a state of universal liberty if they 
define rules to which all those affected could agree in their capacity as autonomous and 
rational actors (Kant 1966,1992). As Isaiah Berlin (1958: 29–39) pointed out, however, 
this potential-consensus test could justify a very intrusive regulatory state – especially 
when decisions are delegated to the “deliberation” of politically independent agencies 
or courts (Somek 2008). In other words, Kantian liberalism based on the categorical 
imperative – just like Rousseau’s republicanism based on the volonté générale – may well 
be invoked to legitimate laws and policies that depart widely from the empirical prefer-
ences of self-interested citizens. 
Constitutional democracies – and the EU?
Obviously, this rough sketch exaggerates the differences between the dual traditions of 
Western political philosophy, and a fuller treatment would have to be more nuanced 
and differentiated. What matters here, however, is the fact that the legitimacy of West-
ern constitutional democracies rests on normative arguments derived from both of 
these traditions. They are all liberal in the sense that governing powers are constitution-
ally constrained, that basic human rights are protected and that plural interests have 
access to the policy-making processes by which they are affected. At the same time, they 
all are republican in the sense that they are representative democracies where governing 
authority is obtained and withdrawn through regular, universal, free and equal elec-
tions, where policy choices are shaped through public debates and the competition of 
political parties, and where institutions that are exempt from electoral accountability 
will still operate in the shadow of democratic majorities or, at least, of a democratic 
pouvoir constituant. In other words, republican and liberal principles coexist, and they 
constrain, complement and reinforce each other in the constitutions and political prac-
tices of all Western democracies (Bellamy 2006). In a sense, they are mutual antidotes 
against each other’s characteristic perversions – as republican collectivism is moderated 
by the protection of individual liberties, whereas libertarian egotism is constrained by 
the institutions of collective self-determination. 
Nevertheless, the actual combinations vary, and differences matter: Republican politics 
are facilitated in unitary states and impeded by federal constitutions; individual inter-
ests receive less judicial protection where the constitution emphasizes parliamentary 
sovereignty; and consensus-dependent pluralism is stronger in the United States or in 
Switzerland than it is in the UK, New Zealand or France.4 But these differences seem to 
4 Looking at the “semantics” of national normative discourses rather than at institutions and 
practices, Richard Münch (2008a: ch. 4) identifies France with republicanism and Britain with 
liberalism. In his view, however, both are manifestations of a common European commitment 
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fade in importance if we now turn our attention from the world of democratic nation 
states to the European Union. When seen by itself and judged by these standards, the 
Union appears as the extreme case of a polity conforming to liberal principles which, at 
the same time, lacks practically all republican credentials. 
The EU’s liberalism is most obvious in the priority it accords to the protection of (some) 
individual rights and the tight constraints impeding political action: The European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) is more immune from political correction than the constitu-
tional court of any democratic state. From early on, it has interpreted the Treaty com-
mitment to establish a Europe-wide market and the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital not as a programmatic goal to be realized through political legisla-
tion, but as a set of directly enforceable individual rights that will override all laws and 
institutional arrangements of EU member states. In the same spirit, the principle of 
non-discrimination on grounds of nationality and the politically rudimentary status of 
European citizenship have been turned into individual rights of EU nationals to have 
access to the social benefits and public services of all member states (Wollenschläger 
2007). At the prodding of national constitutional courts, moreover, the ECJ has also 
begun to protect non-economic human rights; and with the inclusion of the Charter of 
Basic Rights in the Constitutional Treaty, the Court will be able to make the European 
protection of individual rights complete.
At the same time, the European polity’s capacity for collective political action is impeded 
by extremely high consensus requirements, and the input side of its political processes 
could not be more pluralist and less majoritarian in character. The Commission itself, 
which has a monopoly of legislative initiatives, relies on an extended infrastructure of 
committees and expert groups allowing access to a wide range of organized interests. 
Moreover, through the Council of Ministers, whose agreement by at least a qualified-
majority vote is required for all legislation, all interests that have access to the national 
ministries in charge will also have access to the European level. Finally, the European 
Parliament, whose role in legislation has been considerably expanded in recent Treaty 
revisions, also prides itself on giving voice to interests and concerns that might possibly 
have been ignored in the Commission and the Council. In short, European legislation is 
characterized by very open and diversified access opportunities which, combined with 
very high consensus requirements, make it unlikely that its effect on major (organized) 
interests might be ignored in the process. And consensus is of course also the hallmark 
of the “New Modes of Governance” which are employed to achieve policy coordination 
through “soft law,” “benchmarking,” “deliberation” and “institutional learning” in fields 
where the Union may still lack the power to legislate (Héritier 2003; Héritier/Lehmkuhl 
2008; Kohler-Koch/Rittberger 2006).
to “moral universalism and ethical individualism” which drives the European transformation of 
national societies. 
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To complete the liberal model on the output side, the EU has developed considerable ef-
fectiveness as a regulatory authority. It is most powerful in the field of monetary policy, 
where policies of the European Central Bank are completely immune to political inter-
vention. Moreover, the Commission and the Court have enjoyed similar political inde-
pendence in developing a very effective competition regime, not only for the private 
sector but also for state aids and the public service and infrastructure functions that 
might distort market competition. Some of these regimes could be based directly on 
the Treaties, while others depended on political compromises and European legislation. 
Even there, however, the Commission, the Court and a number of European standard 
setting agencies have come to play such important roles in the licensing of pharmaceu-
ticals and the regulation of product safety, food quality, environmental standards or 
workplace discrimination, that the EU’s effectiveness as a “regulatory state” could be 
described as its paramount legitimating achievement (Majone 1996, 1998).
But if the EU might well qualify by liberal standards, it would definitely fail by the 
criteria of republican democracy. On the output side, the Union’s capacity to promote 
the common good is constrained by the extremely high consensus requirements of EU 
legislation. They prevent effective collective action in response to many problems that 
member states could not deal with nationally. The EU’s notorious inability to regulate 
competition over taxes on company profits and capital incomes is just one example 
(Ganghof/Genschel 2008a, 2008b). Worse yet, these same decision rules are responsible 
for an extreme conservative bias of EU policy. New legislation may be based on broad 
consensus. But once it is adopted, it cannot be abolished or amended in response to 
changed circumstances or changed preferences as long as either the Commission re-
fuses to present an initiative or a few member states object. Beyond that, it is only pos-
sible to correct rules derived from the judicial interpretation of the Treaties through 
Treaty amendments, which must be adopted unanimously by all member governments 
and ratified by parliaments or popular referenda in all member states. In other words, 
once EU law is in place, the acquis is nearly irreversible, and its correspondence with the 
common good becomes progressively more tenuous as time goes on. 
The constraints of consensual decision making cannot be significantly relaxed as long 
as the peoples of the 27 member states lack a collective identity that could legitimate 
Europe-wide majority rule. And even if citizens were to develop a sense of common 
solidarity and a stronger attachment to the European polity than to their own nation 
state (perhaps in response to external challenges from America, Russia or China), they 
would presently lack all the societal and institutional prerequisites of input-oriented 
democracy: There are no Europe-wide media of communication and political debates, 
no Europe-wide political parties, no Europe-wide party competition focused on highly 
salient European policy choices, and no politically accountable European government 
that must anticipate and respond to the egalitarian control of Europe-wide election 
returns. There is no theoretical reason to think that these deficits should be written in 
stone. But at present, input-oriented republican legitimacy cannot be claimed for the 
Union. 
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While these stylized diagnoses may be somewhat overdrawn, they suggest a prima facie 
plausible interpretation of current disputes over the existence of a “European demo-
cratic deficit.” Authors and political actors starting from a “liberal” framework of nor-
mative political theory will find it easy to attest to the democratic legitimacy of the 
European Union by pointing to its protection of individual rights, its pluralist open-
ness to policy inputs, its consensual decision-making rules and the effectiveness of its 
regulatory policies (Moravcsik 1998, 2002). By contrast, authors and political actors 
viewing the EU from a “republican” perspective will point to deficiencies on the output 
side, where concern for individual rights and responsiveness to organized interests are 
accompanied by a systemic neglect of redistributive policy goals. Their more salient 
criticism, however, is directed at the glaring democratic deficits on the input side, em-
phasizing the lack of a common public space, of Europe-wide political debates, of party 
competition and of political accountability (Greven 2000; Harlow 2002; Follesdal/Hix 
2006; Hix 2008). While some of these authors nevertheless assume that these deficien-
cies might eventually be overcome through institutional reforms and the mobilization 
strategies of European parties, they seem to underestimate the disruptive potential of 
political mobilization and confrontation in an institutional framework which, in the 
absence of a strong collective identity, would still require consensual decision making 
(Bartolini 2005, 2008). 
2 Legitimacy in multilevel polities
In any case, however, the European Union in its present shape is so far from meeting 
the republican criteria of democratic legitimacy that it cannot benefit from the coexis-
tence and mutual reinforcement of liberal and republican principles that supports the 
legitimacy of constitutional democracies at the national level (Preuss 1999). But does 
this matter if it is acknowledged that the EU is not a free-standing, single-level polity? 
In the two-level constellation of the European polity, the member states are indeed ex-
pected to conform to the full range of liberal as well as republican criteria of legitimacy. 
It seems reasonable to ask, therefore, how this constellation should be treated in norma-
tive discussions about the legitimacy of the European polity. 
When seeking an answer, it is useful to compare the compliance and legitimating re-
lationships between citizens and governments in different institutional constellations. 
In a unitary state, these relationships are congruent: The central government demands 
compliance through its administrative agencies, and the legitimacy of these requests 
is established through national public discourses and the accountability of the central 
government to the national electorate. Congruence can also be achieved in two-level 
polities if their institutional architecture conforms to the model of “dual federalism.” 
Here, each level of government has its own domain of autonomous legislative authority, 
its own implementation structures, and its own base of electoral accountability. 
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Matters are more complicated, however, in a “unitary federal state” like Germany, where 
most legislative powers are exercised nationally, whereas national legislation is imple-
mented by the Länder. Hence Land authorities are expected to comply with federal 
mandates, and citizens are expected to comply with the rules enforced by the Land au-
thorities, regardless of their national or local origin. In the unitary political culture of 
the German two-level polity, however, this two-step compliance relationship does not 
create problems of democratic accountability. Public attention and public debates are al-
most exclusively focused on politics and policy choices at the national level. Länder elec-
tions, which may affect party-political majorities at the national level (in the Bundesrat), 
are generally and justifiably considered to be second-order national elections, where 
parties argue about national issues and voters express their approval or disapproval 
of the national government’s performance (Burkhart 2008). In other words, while the 
compliance relationship takes place between citizens and their respective Länder au-
thorities, the dominant legitimacy relationship in Germany exists between citizens and 
the national government, which is held accountable for public policies that affect the 
citizen. 
The two-level polity comprising the European Union and its member states shares some 
important structural characteristics with German federalism (Scharpf 1988) – but in 
the context of a discussion about political legitimacy, the differences appear to be much 
more important than the similarities. Compared to Germany, the Union is far more 
dependent upon its member states: European legislation must be transposed through 
national legislatures; European law must be implemented through the administrative 
agencies and courts of the member states; and European revenue depends almost en-
tirely on national contributions. As a consequence, compliance is even more of a two-
step process than it is in Germany. 
From the citizens’ perspective, compliance is demanded exclusively by national adminis-
trative agencies, tax authorities and courts. And except where the Commission may di-
rectly prosecute the violation of competition rules, even businesses are never directly 
confronted by the European Union as a governing authority. By the same token, the 
compliance that matters from the Union’s perspective is the willingness and ability of 
its member governments to ensure the implementation of European law. This is the 
Figure 1 Compliance and legitimation in multilevel governments
Unitary 
government
Dual 
federalism
Unitary 
federalism
European 
Union
Highest level 
government
Intermediate level 
government
Citizens – subjects
Upward arrows: legitimation; downward arrows: compliance
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compliance which the Commission keeps monitoring, and which is also the subject of 
a growing body of compliance research (Falkner et al. 2005; Zürn/Joerges 2005; Börzel 
et al. 2007). 
Therefore, just as we see in Germany, we have a two-step compliance relationship – be-
tween citizens and their respective national governments, and between these govern-
ments and the European Union. In contrast to Germany, however, we also see a two-
step legitimating relationship in the European polity. Whereas in German federalism, 
citizens address their demands and their electoral responses to the higher (national) 
level of government, the higher level of the European polity is beyond the horizon of 
citizen’s expectations and political demands; it is not the target of public debates and 
party competition, and it is not vulnerable to electoral sanctions (Mair 2008). As far as 
citizens are concerned, they are only connected to the lower (member-state) level of 
government through a legitimating feedback loop. And since voters are not obliged to 
be fair – and, in any case, could not know the origin of the rules with which they are 
asked to comply – “the politics of blame avoidance” (Weaver 1986) is not a useful op-
tion for member governments. In fact, they must carry the full burden of political ac-
countability for their exercise of governing authority, regardless of how much European 
law may have contributed to it. 
In the two-level European polity, therefore, the EU must be seen and legitimated not as 
a government of citizens, but as a government of governments. What matters first and 
foremost is the willingness and ability of member states to implement EU law and to 
assume political responsibility for doing so. It seems fully appropriate, therefore, that 
compliance research focuses exclusively on the relationship between the EU and its 
member states. But if that is the case, then it does not logically follow that normative 
discussions of EU legitimacy should treat the Union as if it were a free-standing pol-
ity, nor that normative discussions of EU legitimacy should employ monistic concepts 
that ignore the two-step relationship and focus almost exclusively on the presence or 
absence of a “democratic deficit” in the relationship between the EU and its citizens or 
subjects. Instead, we need to discuss the legitimating arguments that justify the compli-
ance of member states with EU mandates, and the conditions that allow member states 
to legitimate this compliance in relation to their own citizens. 
3 Legitimating member state compliance
From the perspective of member governments, membership in the European Union is 
fully justified in terms of its contribution to peace and democracy on the European con-
tinent, while the record appears more ambivalent with regard to the economic promises 
of integration. In any case, the attraction of membership continues to exercise its pull 
in the near abroad, and secession does not seem to be on the agenda for any of the old 
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and newer member states. But just as the fact that most citizens will not emigrate is 
not a sufficient indicator of the democratic legitimacy of a nation state, an holistic as-
sessment of the benefits of membership will not, by itself, establish the legitimacy of all 
Union mandates. As is true in democratic nation states, what matters are more specific 
characteristics of the policy-making institutions and processes that generate the man-
dates with which member governments are expected to comply. Here, I find it useful 
to distinguish between two fundamentally different modes of EU policy making, for 
which I use the labels “political” and “non-political” (Scharpf 2001). 
Political modes are those in which member governments have a voice – most directly in 
Treaty negotiations and in those policy areas where EU legislation still requires unani-
mous agreement. But even where legislation by the “Community Method” depends on 
an initiative by the Commission and the agreement of the European Parliament, the 
requirement of qualified majorities in the Council and the consensus-enhancing proce-
dures of the Council ensure member governments of a significant voice in the process. 
This is not the case in the non-political modes of EU policy making. Member states – or 
the European Parliament, for that matter – have no voice when the European Central 
Bank determines the course of monetary policy, when the Commission decides to pros-
ecute certain EU member state practices as Treaty violations, or when the European 
Court of Justice uses its powers of interpretation to shape the substance of primary and 
secondary European law. Since the effects of policies adopted in this way may exceed 
the importance of many acts of EU legislation, their legitimacy needs to be explicitly 
discussed as well.
Political modes of policy making
From the perspective of member governments, the high consensus requirements of 
EU legislation would seem to ensure its input legitimacy. Policies are adopted with the 
member states’ agreement, and even where Council votes are taken by qualified major-
ity, consensus-seeking practices are so effective that politically salient national interests 
which are vigorously defended by the respective governments are rarely overruled. But 
this does not mean that EU legislation is problem-free from the perspective of member 
governments. 
The most obvious problem is that high consensus requirements often5 prevent majori-
ties of member states from achieving “European solutions” to problems which, in their 
5 Often, but not always. There are indeed policy areas where EU legislation appears more “pro-
gressive” and “perfectionist” than one would expect in light of the political preferences of the 
median member state – for instance, the fields of consumer protection, work safety or envi-
ronmental policy. One reason for this may be the strong commitment to the success of EU 
initiatives on the part of “Europhile” national representatives in the Council Secretariat and in 
COREPER (Lewis 2005). But at least one contributing cause may also be the relative weakness 
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view, should and could be resolved at the European level. From their perspective, there-
fore, the output legitimacy of European legislation remains systematically constrained. 
Nevertheless, where this is a first attempt at European regulation, failure to agree on 
common rules leaves member governments free to cope with the problem in question 
as best as they can at the national level. A potentially much more difficult problem arises, 
however, once a European rule is in place. Its “supremacy” will not only displace any 
existing national law that is inconsistent with it, but it will also “occupy the field” and 
preempt future attempts to deal with the same matter through national legislation. 
At the same time, moreover, the existing European rule is now protected against changes 
by exactly the same high consensus requirements that had impeded its earlier adoption. 
So even if a policy does not work, or if circumstances or the political preferences of most 
member governments have changed significantly, it will remain in force and cannot be 
reformed as long as it is still supported by either the Commission (without whose ini-
tiative no amendments are possible) or by a small blocking minority in the Council.6 
In other words, European legislation is much less reversible than national legis lation, 
which may be adopted, amended and revoked by the same simple majorities.7 As a 
consequence, the presumption that existing legislation continues to be supported by a 
political consensus is less plausible for the EU – and the potential discrepancy is bound 
to increase over time. 
Non-political policy making
The presumption of consensus is, of course, even more attenuated for the non-polit-
ical modes of EU policy-making in which member states have no voice. As far as the 
monetary policy choices of the European Central Bank are concerned, the Maastricht 
Treaty stipulated an unconditional preference for price stability over all other goals of 
of cross-sectional policy coordination within the Commission and in the Council. This may al-
low policy specialists whose aspirations are frustrated in inter-ministerial bargaining at home to 
pursue these in intergovernmental consensus within their specialized Council. Thus, we should 
primarily expect to see blockades and compromises on the lowest common denominator in cas-
es where intergovernmental conflicts occur within the same specialized policy area – as seems to 
be true for tax harmonization, industrial relations or social policy.
6 In fact, resistance to reform may be stronger than resistance to the initial adoption of a policy 
– which may benefit from a widely shared interest in having some “European solution” to press-
ing national problems. Once this interest is satisfied, beneficiaries of the status-quo rule may 
resist later reforms. This problem must be particularly acute for the new member states, which 
are bound by an aquis in whose adoption they had no voice, which may not fit their conditions, 
and which cannot be modified to accommodate their interests and preferences. 
7 Even more than two decades ago, Cappelletti et al. (1985: 40) spoke of the “acute danger of legal 
obsolescence” arising from “the combination of binding instruments and irreversible Commu-
nity competence coupled with the increasingly tortuous Community decision-making process.” 
It did not become attenuated over time.
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economic policy (Art. 105 ECT). And even if governments might prefer a more flexible 
mandate today, they couldn’t adopt it over the objections of even a single member state. 
The same is true of the Court’s power to interpret European law (Art. 220 ECT). If the 
interpretation is based on provisions of the European Treaties, reversals by unanimous 
Treaty amendments are practically impossible, and they are extremely difficult for the 
“secondary law” of European regulations and directives.
If the difficulty of reversing or amending EU law creates an asymmetry between the de-
fenders of the status quo and the promoters of change, what matters here is that it also 
creates an asymmetry in the principal-agent relationship between those who are politi-
cally legitimated to formulate European law and those who have a mandate to apply it. 
Since application always requires some interpretation, the agents necessarily have some 
power to shape the content of the rules under which they operate. And the domain of 
that power will expand if legislators are unable to correct interpretations that devi-
ate from the legislative intent (Tsebelis 2002). Given the immense obstacles to amend-
ing the European Treaties and secondary European law, the potential scope for judicial 
legis lation is wider in the European Union than it is in all constitutional democracies at 
the national level. But should this wider scope of judicial review give rise to problems of 
legitimacy? To the extent that anyone considers this question at all, a negative answer is 
generally based on one of two arguments, neither of which seems fully convincing. 
The first argument sees the Court playing a role that was institutionalized by member 
states to serve their rational self-interest. They agreed to give the Commission the power 
to prosecute, and to the Court the power to decide on, alleged violations of their obliga-
tions under the Treaties. And, like the European Central Bank, the Commission and the 
Court are doing exactly what they are supposed to do, even if individual governments 
may not like their decision in a particular case that affects them individually (Garrett 
1992, 1995). The basic argument is analytical and game-theoretical. It presumes that 
the Treaty commitments of member governments should be modelled as a (symmetric) 
N-person Prisoners’ Dilemma – i.e. a constellation where everyone will benefit from 
cooperation, but everyone is tempted to free-ride, in which case the cooperative ar-
rangement would unravel and everyone would be worse off. Given these conditions, it 
was rational for all governments to create agencies that are beyond their direct political 
control, and to invest these agencies with the authority to monitor and sanction viola-
tions of their commitments. 
Empirically, this argument is surely over-generalized. The assumption that EU law re-
flects constellations of a symmetrical Prisoners’ Dilemma may be plausible where free-
trade rules are concerned, but the jurisdiction of the Court extends to a wide range of 
policy areas that cannot be characterized in this way. Moreover, even within its empiri-
cal domain, the argument is theoretically over-extended. The Dilemma model provides 
justification for creating politically independent enforcement agencies that will monitor 
compliance and may prosecute and sanction free riders. But it provides no analytical or 
normative support for taking the rule-making function out of the hands of politically 
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accountable principals.8 Moreover, not much is gained if the Dilemma argument is 
complemented by an “incomplete-contracts” extension (Maskin/Tyrol 1999). 
This second argument suggests that in a contract situation, rational actors, realizing that 
they could not foresee and regulate all future eventualities, and appreciating the high 
transaction costs of continuous renegotiation, would agree to have future disputes over 
the interpretation of their contract settled by a neutral agent. In game-theoretical terms, 
this argument presupposes an underlying interest constellation resembling the “Battle 
of the Sexes” – where all parties prefer agreement over non-agreement, but disagree 
over the choice among specific solutions (Scharpf 1997: ch. 6). But while this argument 
may support the Commission’s strong role as an “honest broker” in the process of Eu-
ropean political legislation, it does not support judicial legislation. 
By way of explanation, let us assume two sets of member states, one with status-quo in-
stitutions resembling “liberal market economies” and a political preference for a liberal 
European regime, and the other one with the status-quo institutions of a “coordinated 
market economy” and a preference for regulated capitalism at the European level (Hall/
Soskice 2001). In political legislation, it might be possible to find a compromise that 
both sides prefer over their respective status-quo solutions. If not, the different national 
regimes would remain in place. If the Court is allowed to define the European rule, 
however, it must do so in a specific case that challenges and may invalidate the existing 
law of a particular member state without its consent. In doing so, however, the Court 
cannot create a new European regime to replace national solutions; it can only remove 
existing national impediments to the free movement of goods, services, capital and per-
sons, to the freedom of establishment, to undistorted competition, and to the principle 
of non-discrimination. In other words: For structural reasons (which are quite inde-
pendent of any “neoliberal” preferences on the part of the judges), judicial legislation 
must have an asymmetric impact on our two sets of member states: By itself, it can only 
impose liberalizing and deregulatory policies. Under conditions of complete informa-
tion, therefore, member states with coordinated market economies and concomitant 
political preferences would not be persuaded by an incomplete-contracts argument and 
would not accept rule-making by judicial legislation. 
In the actual history of European integration, however, that choice was not available. 
Since the “Luxembourg Compromise” reinforced the unanimity rule in the Council, 
the greater diversity of national interests after the UK, Denmark and Ireland joined the 
original Six almost stopped the progress of integration through political legislation. In 
8 Similar empirical and theoretical objections apply to efficiency-based arguments which try to 
exempt the European “regulatory state” from the need for political legitimation (Majone 1996). 
At best, these apply to a narrow subset of European policy areas. And even here, efficiency argu-
ments presuppose value judgments about ends and means, and efficiency-oriented decisions 
generate distributional consequences that require political legitimation (Follesdal/Hix 2006; 
Hix 2008).
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particular, attempts at harmonizing national trade regulations had bogged down in 
interminable bargaining rounds. Hence, the Court was widely applauded when its Das-
sonville 9 and Cassis 10 decisions began to remove national non-tariff barriers by putting 
Treaty-based economic liberties into direct effect. In effect, “good Europeans” every-
where came to welcome “Integration Through Law”11 as an effective substitute for the 
perceived erosion of the “political will” of member states. 
Paradoxically, however, the immediate effect was to provide a new stimulus for political 
integration. The Cassis decision had confronted all member states with the threat of hav-
ing their own regulations displaced by a rule of “mutual recognition” – a threat which, 
whenever the Commission so chose, could be made real through Treaty infringement 
prosecutions (Schmidt 2007; Nicolaidis/Schmidt 2007). With this change of the “default 
condition,” an agreement on political harmonization became considerably more attrac-
tive. Thus, member states responded positively to Jacques Delors’ Single-Market initia-
tive and agreed to adopt the Single European Act which introduced qualified-majority 
voting in the Council for the harmonization of rules which affect the functioning of the 
internal market (Art. 95 ECT). And since Cassis had reduced the bargaining power of 
high-regulation countries, the new legislation also had a liberalizing and deregulatory 
tendency. 
It is true that in the 1980s, that effect did indeed correspond to the political preferences 
of a majority of “liberal” governments in the Council (Moravcsik 1998). But it is not 
explained by these preferences. But these preferences do not explain the adoption of 
the Single European Act. And the legislation was not reversed when, in the second half 
of the 1990s, there was a preponderance of left-of-center governments in the European 
Union. Instead, the overall pattern is now shaped by an institutional constellation in 
which political legislation must be negotiated in the shadow of judicial decisions which, 
for structural reasons, have a liberalizing and deregulatory impact. In other words, 
the empowerment of judicial legislation in the European polity cannot be justified by 
game-theoretical or contract-theoretical arguments that try to show that self-interested 
member states or their governments would, or ought to, choose it as an efficiency-
increasing solution. 
For most governments, of course, justifications derived from normative rational-choice 
theory are not crucially relevant. What did and does matter much more for them is the 
socially shared expectation that they should operate as “a government of laws and not 
of men,” that courts should have the authority “to say what the law is,” and that respect 
9 C-8/74, 11.7.1974. 
10 C-120/78, 20.2.1979.
11 This is the common title of the series of volumes produced by the famous “European Legal 
Integration Project” of the EUI Law Department (Cappelletti et al. 1985a). It should be noted, 
however, that the editors of the series were very much aware of the normative and pragmat-
ic ambivalences implied by the divergence of legal and political integration (Cappelletti et al. 
1985b).
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for the rule of law obliges them to respect and obey the decisions of the European 
Court of Justice (Alter 2001). By itself, of course, this syllogism would not define the 
proper domains of judicial and political legislation (Möllers 2008). It is of course true 
that judge-made law, disciplined by its internal juristic logic and by the running com-
mentary of the legal profession, continues to play a very important and legitimate role 
in common-law as well as in civil-law countries. But in constitutional democracies, it 
is developed in the shadow of democratically legitimated legislation which could (but 
generally will not) correct it by simple-majority vote. Since ECJ jurisprudence cannot 
be corrected politically, the fact that member states have, by and large, acquiesced even 
when decisions were going against them, cannot be invoked as an indirect legitimation 
of judicial legislation. 
The more pertinent question, therefore, is whether the legitimacy of ECJ jurisdiction 
could be equated with that of national constitutional courts. The latter may indeed 
override parliamentary legislation – and for that reason, the legitimacy of judicial re-
view continues to be considered problematic in polities with a strong democratic tradi-
tion (Bickel 1962; Kramer 2004; Bellamy 2007). But even if we postpone these funda-
mental doubts for the moment, we cannot equate the status of ECJ jurisprudence with 
that of judicial review under national constitutions. First, as Stefano Bartolini (2008) 
points out, we would have to ignore the fact that national constitutions are generally 
limited to rules that organize the institutions of government and protect civil liberties 
and human rights. By contrast, the European Treaties, as they are interpreted by the 
ECJ, include a wide range of detailed provisions, which in constitutional democracies 
are matters for legislative determination rather than constitutional interpretation. As a 
consequence, the politically unconstrained powers of the ECJ reach much further than 
the powers of judicial review under any national constitution. Even more important, 
however, is a second difference: 
The judicial review exercised by national constitutional courts is embedded in national 
political cultures in which normative and cognitive understandings and shared dis-
courses about appropriate policy choices are taken for granted (March/Olsen 1989). In 
public debates, the courts are important, but they are by no means the only interpreters 
of common value orientations. They must assume that the commitment to the com-
mon values of the polity is shared by all branches of the national government, and that 
all are oath-bound to uphold the constitution. They will thus approach legislation in 
a sprit of judicial self-restraint, and with a presumption of its constitutionality. And 
if they must nevertheless intervene against the majorities of the day, the legitimacy of 
their intervention depends upon their capacity to express “the sober second thought of 
the Community” (Bickel 1962: 26; Fisher 1988; Höreth 2008). 
From the perspective of the member states, these preconditions of judicial self-re-
straint, which simultaneously limit and legitimate judicial review, are lacking in their 
relationship to the ECJ. Regardless of what may be true of the Court’s relationship to 
the Commission and the European Parliament, there cannot be such shared orienta-
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tions between the Court and the governments, legislatures and publics of the Union’s 
27 extremely heterogeneous member states, and there is certainly no presumption of 
Treaty conformity when the Court is dealing with national legislation. Instead, from the 
Court’s perspective, European integration is a mission to be realized against the inertia 
or recalcitrance of member states; and European law is not the expression of shared 
values but an instrument to discipline and transform national policies, institutions and 
practices. 
So where has this discussion led us? There is, of course, no question about the formal 
legality of the Court’s jurisdiction. Art. 220 ECT has clearly empowered it to apply and 
interpret European law. Lawyers may dispute some of its interpretations, but they will 
not judge them ultra vires.12 Given the sweeping generality of some Treaty provisions 
and the intentional ambiguities in secondary law, it would, in any case, be extremely 
difficult for the Court to follow the “original intent” of the masters of the Treaties or 
of the multiple authors of legislative compromises. But as Europeans have had to learn 
through bitter experience, formal legality does not necessarily equal legitimacy (Joerges/
Ghaleigh 2003). It suffices to ensure acquiescence with the everyday constraints and 
demands imposed by governing authorities in fundamentally legitimate polities. But 
when highly salient interests and normative preferences are violated, positive legitimat-
ing arguments are needed to stabilize the routines of voluntary compliance.
In the relationship between member states and the EU, the Roman-law maxims of pacta 
sunt servanda and volenti non fit iniurua have considerable weight. Their governments 
or their predecessors have participated in creating present-day EU institutions, includ-
ing the authorization of policy-making in the non-political decision modes; and gov-
ernments of the newer member states have knowingly joined the previously established 
institutions and the accumulated acquis. But these obligations are limited by the third 
Roman maxim of ultra posse nemo obligatur. And as I suggested above, the capacity of 
member states to comply with EU law reaches its limits when doing so would under-
mine their own legitimacy in relation to their national constituencies. In the following 
sections, I will first explore the general conditions of this legitimating relationship and 
then turn to a series of recent decisions in which the jurisdiction of the ECJ seems to be 
pushing against the limits of legitimate compliance.
12 The most obvious characteristic of ECJ jurisprudence is its extreme form of teleological inter-
pretation (effet util). But this problematic tendency is shared by modern national jurisprudence 
as well (Lübbe-Wolf 2007).
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4 The need for justification
Since the law of the Union must be implemented by its member states, it is the legiti-
macy of the member state that must ensure citizen compliance and citizen support. As 
conceptualized above, this law is based on “liberal” as well as “republican” normative 
foundations. By and large, however, the EU law generated through judicial legislation 
is unlikely to challenge the specifically liberal principles of national constitutions.13 But 
what may indeed be at stake is the “republican” legitimacy of national governments. 
Democratic republicanism does not merely require the formal existence of general elec-
tions and representative parliaments; it also presumes that the mechanisms of electoral 
accountability may make a difference for public policy. At a minimum, this (input-
oriented) requirement implies that governments will be responsive to citizen interests 
and preferences, and that changing governments may have an effect on policies that are 
strongly opposed by popular majorities. At the same time, however, governments are 
under a “republican” (and output-oriented) obligation to use the powers of govern-
ment for the common good of the polity. In the normative traditions of constitutional 
democracies, both of these obligations are of equal and fundamental importance. But 
their implications may conflict when public-interest oriented policies are unpopu-
lar while popular policies may endanger the public interest. Under these conditions, 
normative political theory from Aristotle to Edmund Burke did accord priority to the 
public interest, whereas even theorists of democracy who reject the paternalistic or 
technocratic implications of output-oriented arguments (Greven 2000; Bartolini 2005; 
Hix 2008) will rarely defend radical populism as a normatively acceptable alternative 
(Mény/Surel 2002). 
Instead, modern democratic theory focuses on the interactions between governors 
and the governed. Responsible governments must pursue the common good, but its 
substantive understanding, and the policies serving its attainment, should arise from 
deliberative interactions in the shared public space of the polity (Habermas 1962, 
1992, 2008; Dryzek 2000; Greven 2000; Vreese/Schmitt 2007). More specifically, Vivien 
Schmidt (2004, 2006) focuses on the role of policy-oriented “communicative discourses” 
in which governors must explain and justify the unpopular policies which they consider 
necessary and normatively appropriate. The more these policies violate highly salient 
interests or deviate from the strongly held normative preferences of their constituency, 
the more urgent is the need for justification showing how the measures in question will 
serve the values of the polity under the present circumstances. 
13 It is true that the protection of human rights was at issue when the German constitutional court 
initially considered the possibility that it might have to review the constitutionality of EU law 
in its Solange decisions – BverfGE 37, 271 (29.5.1974), BverfGE 73, 339 (22.10.1986). In the 
meantime, the ECJ responded, and this issue has been laid to rest (Weiler/Lockhart 1995). 
Scharpf: Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity 21
If these communicative discourses succeed in persuading the constituency, input-ori-
ented policy legitimacy is maintained. If they fail to persuade, governments are at risk. 
In general, of course, electoral accountability is neither a precisely targeted nor a very 
sensitive mechanism of popular control. Voters only have a single ballot with which 
to express their pleasure or displeasure over a multitude of policy choices, assorted 
scandals and the personality traits of leading candidates; and even if public protest was 
concentrated on a single issue yesterday, it may have disappeared from public attention 
by the next election.14 But if a policy does violate the highly salient interests or deeply 
held normative convictions of the constituency, a government that sticks to its guns but 
fails to convince may indeed go down in defeat.15 If that happens, the governments will 
not have established the input legitimacy of these policies. But it will have reaffirmed 
the institutional legitimacy of the system of responsible and democratically account-
able government. 
The opposite is true, however, if policies that violate politically salient interests and 
normative convictions in national polities are not, and cannot be explained and justi-
fied in communicative discourses. When that happens, the legitimacy of constitutional 
democracies will be undermined und may ultimately be destroyed. This is the critical 
risk if governments are required to implement European law that has been created by 
institutionally autonomous judicial legislation without the involvement of politically 
accountable actors. 
This is not to say that judge-made European law that violates politically salient interests 
or deeply held normative convictions in member-state polities could never be justified 
as being necessary and appropriate. But it suggests that justification is more demand-
ing here than it is in the case of political legislation in which governments had a voice 
and for which they should therefore be able to provide good reasons. In principle, there 
could be two types of justifications.
The first of these would appeal to “enlightened” national self-interest. It would try to 
show how, all things considered, the country would benefit more from the policy or rule 
in question than from its absence. In essence, these are arguments that would facilitate 
agreement in a political bargaining process – and they would justify compliance with 
European rules that are in fact providing effective solutions under conditions which, in 
14 In real-world democracies, political responsiveness may nevertheless be quite high: In Germany, 
national governments are tested in 16 Land elections during the national parliament’s four-year 
term; in all competitive democracies, opposition parties will try their best to refresh voters’ 
memories before the next election; and in any case, governments cannot know in advance which 
issue will ultimately be decisive for which voters. By the “rule of anticipated reactions,” they will 
therefore try to respond to all potential grievances if they can (Scharpf 1997: 183–188). 
15 This was true when the Dutch government reformed disability pensions in the early 1990s 
(Hemerijck et al. 2000: 220–224) and it was again true in Germany when the Schröder govern-
ment pursued its “Agenda 2010” reforms in spite of mass protests and rapidly declining popular 
support (Egle/Zohlhöfer 2007). 
22 MPIfG Working Paper 09/1
game-theoretical terms, resemble Pure Coordination, Assurance, Battle of the Sexes, or 
(symmetric) Prisoners’ Dilemma constellations (Scharpf 1997: ch. 6). But what if the 
constellation is characterized by asymmetric conflicts – so that the rule imposed by the 
non-political European authority cannot be justified in terms of the enlightened self-
interest of the member state in question? Analytically, one might then try to justify un-
compensated national sacrifices by reference to the collective self-interest of the Union 
as a whole. However, depending on the salience of the sacrifice requested, this justifica-
tion would presuppose a collective European identity that is strong enough to override 
concerns of national self-interest. Unfortunately, however, that is a precondition which 
not even the most enthusiastic “Europeans” would claim to see presently fulfilled in the 
Union of 27 member states (Pollak 2008). 
But this does not mean that asymmetric national sacrifices could never be justified in 
national discourses. The most powerful of such justifications is, of course, the achieve-
ment of European integration itself. The outcome has not been, and may (and perhaps 
should) never be, the creation of a “United States of Europe” modelled after successful 
federal nation states (Nicolaidis/Howse 2003). But integration has been able to establish 
peace and cooperation among European nations after centuries of internecine warfare, 
and to secure democracy and respect for human rights on a continent that has brought 
forth the most pernicious regimes in human history. These outcomes could not have 
been attained by the bloody-minded pursuit of national self-interest. Being part of the 
European community of nations presupposes member states whose institutions and 
policies are compatible with the basic requirements of communality, and whose prefer-
ences are modified by a normative commitment to the “inclusion of the other” (Haber-
mas 1996) and by a “principle of constitutional tolerance” that disciplines the assertion 
of national constitutional powers at the expense of shared values and interests (Weiler 
1999b, 2003). The preservation of these achievements may indeed justify constraints 
on national autonomy even where such constraints may conflict with politically salient 
interests and preferences in member polities. Hence, European rules protecting the pre-
conditions of communality, regardless of whether they are formulated in political or 
non-political processes, can be justified on substantive grounds – and if that is the case, 
they also can and should be defended by member governments, even against strong 
domestic opposition. 
5 The Court is pushing against the limits of justifiability 
Given the equally valid legitimation arguments supporting democratic self-determina-
tion at the national level and the normative claims of European communality, however, 
a convincing justification must assess the relative weights at stake in the specific case. 
The greater the political and normative salience of the national institutions and policy 
legacies that are being challenged, the greater must be the normative and practical sig-
Scharpf: Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity 23
nificance of the countervailing European concerns. For many decades, however, the 
need to develop explicit criteria for that normative balance did not arise. Most issues of 
European law never caught the attention of individual national publics, and the Court 
itself seems to have taken care to develop its doctrines in a long series of decisions where 
the substantive outcomes at stake were of very low political salience, if not downright 
trivial. Thus, it was hard to get politically excited about the Cassis decision, which said 
that Germany could not exclude a French liqueur on the grounds that its alcohol con-
tent was not high enough – but which, in doing so, also introduced the crucial doctrines 
of mutual recognition and home-country control. 
That is why earlier warnings of the implications of ECJ jurisprudence for the viability 
of national social systems (see, e.g., Scharpf 1999) could be dismissed as unrealistic 
scares (Moravcsik/Sangiovanni 2003). But now, when the legal principles seem to be 
firmly established in its case law and accepted by national courts, the European Court 
and the Commission appear ready to face more serious political conflicts. I will briefly 
mention only a few recent decisions that illustrate this more intrusive and potentially 
more damaging judicial strategy:
The first case has nothing to do with the neoliberal preferences which are often as-
cribed to the Court and the Commission. Austria, where university education is free 
and accessible to all graduates of a Gymnasium, saw its medical faculties overcrowded 
by applicants from Germany whose grades were not good enough to qualify under the 
German numerus-clausus regime. In response, Austria adopted a rule under which ap-
plicants from abroad had to show that they would also be eligible to study medicine in 
their home country. The Commission initiated a Treaty violation procedure, and the 
Court found that the Austrian rule violated students’ rights to free movement and non-
discrimination under Art. 12 ECT.16 As an immediate result of the decision, more than 
60 percent of the applicants at some Austrian medical faculties came from Germany.
The second series of recent decisions did in fact assert the priority of economic liberties 
over the social rights guaranteed by member-state constitutions. In Viking,17 a Finnish 
shipping company operating from Helsinki had decided to reflag its ferry as an Esto-
nian vessel. The Finnish union threatened to strike, the company sued for an injunction, 
and the case was referred to the ECJ, which defined the strike as an interference with 
the company’s freedom of establishment. In the Laval case,18 a Latvian company build-
ing a school in Sweden refused to negotiate about wages at the minimum level defined 
by Swedish collective bargaining agreements. The ECJ defined the Swedish union’s in-
dustrial action as violation of the company’s freedom of service delivery that was not 
covered by a narrow reading of the Posted Workers’ Directive.19 
16 C-147/03, 7.7.2005.
17 C-438/05, 11.12.2007.
18 C-341/05, 18.12.2007.
19 Directive 96/71/EC.
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If Viking and Laval were directed against the constitutionally protected rights of Finnish 
and Swedish unions to pursue collective interests through industrial action, the Ru-
effert 20 and Luxembourg 21 cases established the priority of free service delivery over 
national wage legislation. Rueffert disallowed a Lower Saxony statute that required 
providers in public procurement to pay locally applicable collective-bargaining wages, 
whereas Luxembourg transposed the Posted Workers’ Directive in a statute requiring all 
providers to observe local labor law, including the automatic adjustment of wages to 
the rate of inflation. In both cases, the Court defined the Directive as setting maximum, 
rather than minimum standards, with the consequence that local legislation that ex-
ceeded these standards was held to violate the freedom of service delivery. At the same 
time, the principle of freedom of establishment is being used to hollow out the capac-
ity of member states to shape the rules of corporate governance in their economies 
(Höpner/Schäfer 2007).22 In other cases, the Court has drastically reduced the capacity 
of member governments to collect revenue from mobile capital (Ganghof/Genschel 
2008b; Genschel et al. 2008). Here, as in the series of decisions enforcing the access of 
EU citizens to public services and social transfers in other member states (Ferrera 2005; 
Martinsen 2005, 2009; Martinsen/Vrangbaek 2008), the Court gives priority to the sub-
jective rights of free movement and non-discrimination without regard to reciprocal 
obligations to contribute to the resources of the polity. 
6 The liberal undermining of republican legitimacy
In these decisions and others, the Court has obviously intervened against important 
and politically salient laws, institutions and practices of individual member states. But 
why should it be impossible to justify these interventions in national communicative 
discourses? The root of the problem is a basic asymmetry in the way that the Court 
defines the balance between the legitimate concerns of member-state autonomy and 
the legitimate requirements of European community.23 It has its origin in the very first 
decision postulating the direct effect of European law in Van Gend en Loos (1963).24 In 
order to establish this doctrine, the Court had to interpret the obligation of a mem-
ber state to maintain existing tariffs as the subjective right of a company against the 
state. Combined with its nearly simultaneous assertion of the supremacy of European 
20 C-346/06, 3.4.2008.
21 C-319/06, 19.6.2008.
22 See, e.g., C-212/97, 9.3.1999 (Centros); C-112/05, 23.10.2007 (Volkswagen).
23 As Joe Weiler (1999a) explained in a different context, the issue is not – or at least not initially – 
a conflict over the location of a Kompetenz-Kompetenz in the multilevel European polity, but 
a concern about the political consequences that will follow from the asymmetric logic of the 
Court’s jurisdiction. 
24 C-26/62, 5.2.1963.
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law,25 this construction has permitted the Court to define and expand subjective rights 
against member states, and thus to shift the balance between the rights and obligations 
of citizens or subjects that had been established in national polities. 
Since the commitments in the original Treaty were primarily intended to achieve eco-
nomic integration, their transformation into “economic liberties” does account for the 
strongly “market-liberal” effects of the Court’s jurisprudence. It should be noted, how-
ever, that where primary or secondary European law provided a handle for the defini-
tion of non-economic subjective rights, the Court has been similarly ready to intervene 
against national impediments to their exercise. This has long been true for decisions 
enforcing and extending the equality of men and women in the work place under Art. 
141 ECT (Cichowski 2004); and it is now also true of the extension of rights to the free 
movement of persons outside of the labor market, of rights of non-discrimination on 
account of nationality and of the generalization of (non-political) citizenship rights. 
This trend has been hailed by some as a fundamental reversal of the Court’s market-
liberal bias (Caporaso 2000; Caporaso/Tarrow 2008) – whereas it is, in fact, only the 
application of its negative-integration and liberalizing logic to new fields.
In the framework developed by the ECJ, the European concerns that might justifiably 
override democratically legitimated national institutions and policy legacies are defined 
as subjective rights of individuals and firms, rather than as substantive requirements on 
which the viability of the European community of nations – or the internal market, 
for that matter – would depend. Given the simultaneous assertion of the supremacy 
doctrine, this definition has the effect of transforming the hierarchical relation between 
European and national law into a hierarchical relationship between liberal and repub-
lican constitutional principles.26 Subjective rights derived from (the interpretation of) 
European law may, in principle, override all countervailing national objectives, regard-
less of their salience as manifestations of democratic self-determination.
Given the impossibility of political correction, the Court was and is, of course, free to 
extend the reach of European rights. In the field of free trade, for instance, the Treaty 
forbids quantitative restrictions and “measures having equivalent effect” (Art. 28 ECT). 
Originally, this had been understood to exclude the discriminatory treatment of im-
ports. In the early 1970s, however, that understanding was replaced by the famous Das-
sonville formula, according to which “all trading rules enacted by member states which are 
capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-community trade 
are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions.” 27 
25 C-6/64, 15.7.1964 (Costa v. ENEL).
26 Richard Münch (2008b: 540) has described the legal order created by the jurisdiction of the ECJ 
as being “made for competitive economic actors. It is more appropriate for the market citizen of 
liberalism than for the political citizen of republicanism or for the social citizen of welfare states 
in the social democratic or conservative sense.” 
27 C-8/74, 11.7.1974.
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In other words, instead of effective discrimination, a merely hypothetical impediment 
to free trade, free capital movement, free service delivery or free establishment would 
now be enough to strike down a national rule. 
It is true that after Dassonville, the Cassis decision also began to systematize the some-
what haphazard public-order exceptions (e.g., in Arts. 30, 39/3, 46/1, 55 or 58/1b ECT) 
through which the Treaty had tried to limit the obligations to liberalize national econo-
mies. In most areas, therefore, the Court does now allow for the possibility that the exer-
cise of European liberties could be limited by (some) countervailing national concerns 
(Haltern 2007: 742–755). But if this has the appearance of a balancing test, the balance 
is highly asymmetrical – a fact which manifests itself in three dimensions:
First, some national concerns of major importance are simply defined as irrelevant to 
begin with. Among these, the issue of greatest practical importance is the refusal to con-
sider national fiscal concerns as a potential limit on the exercise of European liberties. 
Thus, in the Austrian case mentioned above, the effect which the free movement and 
non-discrimination of German students would have on the budgetary constraints of 
Austrian medical education is entirely ignored. The same is true in cases where the free 
movement of persons is invoked to allow migrants access to national social transfers,28 
or where the freedom of service provision requires national health (insurance) systems 
to pay for services consumed abroad (Martinsen 2005, 2009).29 Moreover, revenue con-
cerns are declared irrelevant when national rules against tax avoidance are treated as 
violations of free capital movement (Ganghof/Genschel 2008b). 
By treating the fiscal implications of its decisions as irrelevant, the Court is destroying 
the link between the rights and duties of membership in the polity, which is reflected in 
the centrality of parliamentary taxing and spending powers in all constitutional democ-
racies (Ganghof/Genschel 2008a). From a republican perspective, German students and 
their taxpaying parents may have good reason to protest against the spending priori-
ties of their own governments, but that would not give them a legitimate claim against 
taxpayers in Austria. The same would be true of other tax-financed services, of social 
transfers or of public-health systems and of compulsory health insurance systems in 
which total contributions must finance adequate capacity on the supply side.30 Simi-
larly, firms and individuals availing themselves of the public infrastructure and public 
28 See, e.g., C-10/90, 7.3.1991 (Masgio); C-245/94; C-312/94, 10.10.1996 (Hoever/Zachow); 
C-131/96, 25.6.1997 (Romero); C-160/96, 5.3.1998 (Molenaar); C-85/96, 12.5.1998 (Sala).
29 See, e.g., C-120/95, 28.4.1998 (Decker); C-158/96 28.4.1998 (Kohll); C-157/99, 12.7.2001; 
(Geraets-Smits/Peerbooms); C-385/99, 13.5.2003 (Müller-Fauré/Van Riet).
30 This is not meant to deny that the “inclusion of the other” may imply an obligation to provide 
non-contributory benefits in many constellations. If this obligation is asymmetrically subordi-
nated to fiscal concerns, the trade-off may indeed be corrected through judicial intervention. 
But that balancing question cannot be addressed if fiscal considerations are treated as irrelevant 
by definition. 
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services in one country would be under a republican obligation to contribute to the tax 
price of their maintenance. 
By replacing the reciprocal link between entitlements and contributions with the as-
sertion of unilateral individual rights, the Court may seem generous. But its generos-
ity ignores the club-good character of most of the benefits and services provided by 
the solidaristic nation state. Allowing the easy exit of contributors and the easy entry 
of non-contributors is bound to undermine the viability of these clubs. If the logic 
of these decisions will shape national responses, the most likely outcome will not be 
universal generosity but private insurance, private education and gated communities 
for those who can afford them, and eroding public benefits, public services and public 
infrastructure for those who cannot pay for private solutions (including the no-longer 
discriminated migrant students, workers and their families). 
Second, even where national public-interest objections or nationally protected collec-
tive rights are considered as potential limits on the exercise of European rights, the 
Court’s treatment is highly asymmetrical. Whereas European liberties, no matter how 
trivial their violation may be in the specific case, are accorded full value, all countervail-
ing arguments are discounted by a substantive and procedural “proportionality” test.31 
Here, the Court will first evaluate (by its own lights) the normative acceptability of 
the specific purpose allegedly served by a national measure. And even if the purpose is 
accepted in principle, the government must show that (first) the measure in question 
would in fact be effective in serving the stated purpose and (second) that this purpose 
could not also have been served by other measures which would be less restrictive on 
the exercise of European liberties (Haltern 2007: 751–757). For all of these conditions, 
the burden of proof is on the member state defending a particular impediment to the 
exercise of European liberties and, as Dorte Martinsen (2009) shows, the procedural 
requirements for establishing (scientific) proof can be tightened to an extent that will 
ensure a negative outcome for the member state. 
By way of illustration, let us take the decision striking down the Volkswagen statute,32 which 
defined 20 percent of all shares (instead of the usual 25 percent) as a blocking minority. In 
the Court’s view, this rule created a potential deterrent to direct investments from other 
member states,33 while evidence showing that VW stock was in fact widely traded interna-
tionally and that the share of direct foreign investments was as high as that in comparable 
companies was declared irrelevant. In other words, the existence of an impediment to the 
free movement of capital is treated as an incontrovertible presumption.34 
31 C-261/81 at # 12, 10.11.1982 (Rau).
32 C-74/07, 23.10.2007. The discussion quoted is at # 55. 
33 The Court conceded that private shareholders might set the blocking minority at 20 percent of 
all shares, but insisted that a democratically accountable legislature could not do so. 
34 Since under the Dassonville formula, a potential impediment is sufficient to constitute a viola-
tion of free-movement rights, it is indeed difficult to see what kind of evidence could disprove 
this assertion. 
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Another example is the Austrian case, where the Court did at least entertain the idea 
that the danger of over crow ding in Austrian universities might be a valid national con-
cern. But this idea was quickly dismissed with the suggestion that this problem could 
be averted through non-discriminatory entrance exams.35 The fact that Austria may 
have needed to give priority to Austrian students in order to train a sufficient number 
of medical practitioners for its own health care system remained completely outside 
the range of permissible arguments. In the asymmetrical jurisprudence of the Court, 
in other words, European rights are substantively and procedurally privileged and will 
generally prevail, even over very important and politically salient national concerns. 
A third problem arises from the discrepancy between the uniformity of European law 
and the diversity of national republican institutions. The Treaty-based economic liber-
ties are, of course, defined at the European level, without regard to national differences. 
The same is true where the Court recognizes other subjective rights at the European 
level – rights which may increase in number and variety if the Lisbon Treaty comes 
into force.36 And to the extent that countervailing national concerns are considered at 
all, these are also defined in uniform and (highly restrictive) terms by the Court. For an 
example, take the decision in the Laval case, where the Court would have accepted mini-
mum wages to be set by state legislation, but disallowed the delegation to collective-
bargaining agreements. In doing so, it ignored the fact that minimum-wage legislation, 
while common in many EU member states, was totally unacceptable in “neo-corporat-
ist” Sweden, where since the 1930s wage determination has been left entirely to highly 
organized unions and employers’ associations (Edin/Topel 1997).
In short, the Court’s regime of Treaty-based rights and potentially acceptable national 
exceptions makes no allowance whatsoever for the fact that uniform European law has 
an impact on national institutions and policy legacies which differ widely from one 
member state to another. Such differences exist not only in the field of industrial rela-
tions, but also in corporate governance, public services, public infrastructure, media 
policy, social policy, pension policy, health care, vocational and academic education, 
or public infra struc ture. Present solutions differ because they have been shaped by 
country-specific historical cleavages and by difficult compromises between conserva-
tive, progressive and liberal political forces – which is why any attempted changes tend 
to have very high political salience everywhere. 
Political resistance to change is likely to be strongest in cases where institutions and 
policies have a direct impact on the lives of citizens. This is most obvious for welfare 
state transfers and services, industrial relations, employment conditions, education or 
35 C-147/03 at # 61.
36 As the Laval decision made clear, however, such rights (including the freedoms of expression, 
assembly and the protection of human dignity) can be exercised only within the tight con-
straints of the proportionality test whenever they might impede the economic liberties rooted 
in the Treaty. (C-341/05 at # 94.)
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health care. In many instances, existing policies have attained the status of a “social 
contract” whose commitments support the legitimacy of the national polity. That is not 
meant to suggest that such normatively charged institutions and policy legacies should 
or could be immune to change. In fact, their continuing viability under external and 
internal pressures is often quite uncertain (Scharpf/Schmidt 2000). But if the legitimacy 
of the national polity is to be preserved, such changes must be defended and justified 
in national communicative discourse – by governments who must be ready to face the 
consequences of their electoral accountability. 
In fact, the text of the Treaty does recognize the need to respect the autonomy of mem-
ber-state political processes in precisely these policy areas. In Maastricht and Amsterdam, 
European competencies have been explicitly denied in policy areas of high normative 
salience at the national level. Thus, Article 137/5 ECT stipulates that European compe-
tencies in the field of social affairs “shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right 
to strike or the right to impose lockouts.” Similarly, European measures in the field of em-
ployment “shall not include harmonisation of the laws and regulations of Member States” 
(Art. 129/2 ECT). Exactly the same formula is repeated for education (Art. 149/4 ECT), 
for vocational education (Art. 150/4), and for culture (Art. 151/5), while Art. 152/5 ECT 
provides that “Community action … shall fully respect the responsibilities of the Member 
States for the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care.” In other areas, 
the Treaty has, for similar reasons, maintained the requirement of unanimous decisions 
in the Council. 
In the Court’s legal framework, however, these prohibitions could at best37 impede po-
litical legislation at the European level. But they are considered irrelevant for judicial 
legislation where it is protecting Treaty-based liberties:38 That is why the cases cited 
could – and did indeed – regulate strikes in Finland and Sweden and abolish national 
pay regulations in Germany and Luxembourg, national regulations of university admis-
37 If the Commission should find that the difference between national rules (provided that they 
have individually passed the proportionality test) interferes with the internal market or consti-
tutes a distortion of competition, a harmonizing directive could still be introduced under Arts. 
95 and 96/2 ECT (Haltern 2007: 740–41).
38 The typical formula is that, yes, member states retain the right to shape their own social security 
and health care systems. But in doing so, they must, of course, observe Community law. See, e.g., 
C-158/96 at ## 16, 19–20 (Kohll). 
 This illustrates the fundamental significance of the Court’s initial dogmatic choice: By treating 
the Treaty commitments to creating a common market characterized by the free movement of 
goods, etc., not only as a source of legislative competencies, but as a guarantee of individual 
rights, the Court eliminated the legal possibility of defining areas of national competence that 
cannot be reached by European law. As is true in national federal constitutions, nationally de-
fined and enforced individual rights are a powerful centralizing force which may reach any and 
all substantive fields. While legislative powers may be limited through constitutional amend-
ments, the judicial protection against impediments to the exercise of individual rights knows 
no legal limits. If limits are considered desirable, therefore, they can only be political.
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sions in Austria, as well as national regulations of health services and medical care in 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
In short, even unanimous amendments to the Treaties, formally ratified by all member 
states, could not protect the autonomy of national political processes against judicial 
intervention. In the absence of a political mandate, and ignoring explicit Treaty provi-
sions that were intended to limit the reach of European law, the Court is now interven-
ing in areas that are of crucial importance for the maintenance of democratic legitimacy 
in EU member states.
7 Needed: A political balance of community and autonomy
From a pragmatic perspective, this situation appears dangerous: National welfare states 
are under immense pressure to cope with and adjust to external and internal changes 
(Scharpf/Schmidt 2000). But this adjustment must be achieved through legitimated 
political action. The Court can only destroy existing national solutions, but it cannot 
itself create a “Social Europe.” At the same time, political action at the European level 
is impeded by the prohibitions stipulated in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties – 
and if these were lifted, by high consensus barriers and the politically salient diversity 
of existing national solutions. In short, European law as defined by the Court is under-
mining national solutions without being able to provide remedies at the European level. 
The practical effect must be a reduction of the overall problem-solving capacity of the 
multilevel European polity. 
From a normative perspective, what matters is that the Court’s interventions are based 
on a self-created framework of substantive and procedural European law that has no 
place for a proper assessment of the national concerns that are at stake, and in which the 
flimsiest impediment to the exercise of European liberties may override even extremely 
salient national policy legacies and institutions. Within this highly asymmetrical juris-
tic framework, a normatively persuasive balance between the essential requirements of 
European communality and the equally essential respect for national autonomy and 
diversity cannot even be articulated. By the same token, the legal syllogisms supporting 
these judicial interventions could not possibly persuade opponents in communicative 
discourses between member-state governments and their constituents. In short, the po-
litically unsupported extension of judge-made European law in areas of high political 
salience within member-state polities is undermining the legitimacy bases of the multi-
level European polity. 
But this cannot be a plea for unconstrained member-state autonomy or a relocation of 
the Kompetenz-Kompetenz to the national level (Weiler 1999a). The result might indeed 
be an escalation of protectionist and beggar-my-neighbor policies that could well dis-
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rupt the Union. It should be realized, after all, that – even though the Court never men-
tioned it – Viking and Laval did involve a distributive conflict between high-wage and 
low-wage member states whose fair resolution would have raised difficult normative 
issues – and the same may also be true of the Rueffert and Luxembourg cases.39 There 
are good normative reasons, therefore, for some kind of European review of national 
measures impeding free movement among member states. But such a review would 
need to allow for the fair consideration of all concerns involved – which the jurisdiction 
of the ECJ does not. Its self-referential legal framework prevents any consideration of 
the normative tension between the solidarity achieved with great effort at the national 
level and a moral commitment to the “inclusion of the other” in a European context. 
But which institution would be better qualified to assess the balance between politically 
legitimate (and divergent) national concerns on the one hand, and the equally legiti-
mate constraints that national polities must accept as members of a European commu-
nity of states? In my view, the European institution that would be uniquely qualified 
to strike a fair balance is the European Council.40 From the perspective of individual 
member states, its decision would be a judgment of peers who are aware of the po-
tential domestic repercussions which may be caused by the obligation to implement 
European law, and who must realize that they might soon find themselves in the same 
spot. At the same time, however, these peers would also be fully aware of the dangers 
of protectionist free-riding, beggar-my-neighbor policies and discriminatory practices 
that would violate solidaristic obligations. Moreover – and most importantly – in their 
role as “masters of the Treaties,” the members of the European Council would be best 
placed to determine whether and where the Court, in its interpretation of primary and 
secondary European law, has so far exceeded the legislative intent that a political cor-
rection appears necessary. 
Even if the basic logic of this suggestion were to be accepted, however, its adoption by 
a unanimous Treaty amendment seems most unlikely. But there is one scenario that 
might change these probabilities. I refer back to what I said about the fundamental 
39 But we should remain realistic: The transnational redistributive benefits (for workers from low-
wage countries) that may follow from these judgments are likely to be dwarfed by intra-national 
redistributive damages, as the wages of national workers are pushed downwards while protec-
tive legislation and collective agreements are being disabled. 
40 Joe Weiler (1999a: 322) called for a “Constitutional Council” composed of sitting members of 
national constitutional courts to decide issues of competence; and a similar proposal was re-
cently promoted by Roman Herzog, former president of the German constitutional court and 
of the European convention that produced the Charter of Basic Rights (Herzog/Gerken 2008). 
In my view, being a judicial body that is bound by its own precedents and obliged to general-
ize its decision rules, this Council would also tend to define uniform standards that could not 
accommodate the legitimate diversity among member-state institutions and practices. What is 
needed is the disciplined “ad hocery” of a political judgment that understands that it may be 
necessary, for the time being, to allow national parliaments and courts to have the last word on 
abortion in Ireland, alcohol in Sweden and drugs in the Netherlands (Kurzer 2001), even if that 
should interfere with European liberties protected elsewhere. 
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dependence of the European Union and its legal system on the voluntary compliance 
of its member states, and about the lack of control on the part of political actors over 
the expansion of judicial legislation. Imagine, if you will, that the governments of some 
member states – say Austria or Sweden or Germany – would openly declare their non-
compliance with specific judgments that they consider to be ultra vires. If that were all, 
such a declaration would surely trigger a constitutional crisis. There is, of course, a great 
deal of incomplete compliance and tacit noncompliance among EU member states, but 
a declaration of open non-compliance would strike at the foundations of the European 
legal system. That is why governments would – and indeed should – hesitate to trigger 
this “nuclear option.” But what if the declaration were presented as a reasoned appeal 
to the political judgment of the European Council and coupled with the promise that 
a (majority) vote affirming the ECJ decision would be obeyed? This would separate the 
protest against the ECJ from the charge of disloyalty to the Union.41 
Whether the Council would accept the role thrust upon it by such a declaration is, of 
course, highly uncertain. If it did, however, the Union would finally have a forum42 
and procedures43 in which the basic tension between the equally legitimate concerns of 
community and autonomy could be fairly resolved.44 Similarly welcome would be the 
probable effects on the jurisprudence of the Court itself. Faced with the possibility of 
political reversal in the Council, it could be expected to pay more systematic attention 
to the relative weight of national concerns that might justify minor impediments to 
the exercise of the Treaty-based liberties. If that were the case, European law – even in 
the absence of “republican” input legitimacy – would cease to be characterized by the 
single-minded pursuit of rampant “individualism” (Somek 2008). 
41 As “good Europeans,” in other words, we should stop defining automatic compliance with any 
type of European rule as the criterion of our goodness. We should seek to strengthen the Eu-
ropean political capacity for collective action through legislation and through enhanced ca-
pabilities in the field of foreign and security policy. But we should also become critical of the 
anti-democratic effects of “integration through non-political judicial legislation.”
42 In order to ensure procedural viability, the Council would need to rely on the preparatory work 
of a permanent committee that would hear and evaluate the relevant claims and arguments. But 
the final decision would have to remain with the heads of governments. 
43 In my view, the affirmation of the ECJ judgment should require only a simple majority in the 
Council. 
44 Once introduced, the same rules might also be used to allow “conditional opt-outs” from the 
preemptive effect of the legislative acquis. This would ease the problems caused by the near-
irreversibility of existing secondary law, and the possibility of later opt-outs could also facilitate 
political agreement on new legislation. A similar solution has been discussed in the context of 
federalism reform in Germany (Scharpf 2008). But these extensions go beyond the present ar-
gument and their discussion would exceed the limits of this article. 
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